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Abstract— Hazard radiation can lead the system fault 
therefore Fault Tolerance is required. Fault Tolerant is 
a system, which is designed to keep operations running, 
despite the degradation in the specific module is 
happening. Many fault tolerances have been developed 
to handle the problem, to find the most robust and 
efficient in the possible technology. This paper will 
present the Five Modular Redundancy (FMR) with 
Mitigation Technique to Recover the Error Module. 
With Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration technology that 
have already available today, such fault tolerance 
technique can be implemented successfully. The project 
showed the robustness of the system is increased and 
module which is error can be recovered immediately. 
Keywords- FPGA, Fault Tolerance, Dynamic Partial 
Reconfiguration 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Fault is a changed in the value of a variable or 
unexpected logic in the system hardware, failure is the 
inability of a system to perform the operation from 
predefined requirements [1]. A system fault has a chance for 
failure, it requires a Fault Tolerant system. Fault Tolerant is a 
character system that is designed to continue to run its 
operations despite the degradation of function in the specific 
module, do not stop completely when the failure occurred on 
a particular module [2].  
Fault tolerance design in [3] and [4] is using Triple 
Modular Redundancy (TMR) by means triplicate a module 
or a particular function. In TMR at least two modules 
produce the same results, then the system is considered to be 
running correct.  Since in the orbit in such area is having 
many radiations, as quoted in [5] the TMR design is not 
enough to mitigate the entire fault that is occurs, it may occur 
at two memories at the same time and same position and then 
give two modules in error result. In [5] Nine Modular 
Redundancy (NMR) has been developed to try to handle the 
TMR problem, but leads in using a lot of resources. To full 
fill the gap between those two designs we therefore create a 
new methodology, we called Five Modular Redundancy 
(FMR) with Mitigation Technique to Recover the Error 
Module. In [5] use nine redundancies, but have not been 
implemented a recover technique when some module is an 
error, therefore degradation of a system cannot be avoided. 
By implementing recovering technique to the error module 
such degradation is kept as minimal as possible. To 
overcome in TMR technique, this design will handle the 
problem about radiation bombardment that makes two error 
modules at the same time. 
The scope of this project is about FMR design with 
mitigation technique using DPR technology, we assume 
internal design is free from a fault in which this Fault 
Tolerance aims to handle a fault that is caused by external 
factors e.g. hazard radiations. This paper will show the 
design, implementation and testing of Five Modular 
Redundancy with mitigation technique to recover the error 
module. The testing showed, the design that is developed 
able to handle the error that happen in the two modules at the 
same time and able to detect and recover the error module.  
 
II. DESIGN OF FIVE MODULAR REDUNDANCY WITH 
MITIGATION TECHNIQUE TO RECOVER THE ERROR MODULE 
Five Modular Redundancy (FMR) is the technique to 
duplicate the same module to five times.  The system still 
has correct resulted since the modules are having correct 
result with at least three modules, when the error is 
happening in the two modules the system can still tolerance 
to such error.  Using Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration 
(DPR) will not interrupt the system which is running, 
therefore mitigation to the error module can be done without 
disturbing the system. DPR can be done very fast and low 
power consumption because we only reconfigure to the 
partial area of an FPGA.  
 
Image 1 shows the design of the FMR, having five 
modules that are identical, the output of each module will be 
sent to Voter and Error Detector, then the Voter will vote 
the result from each module and find the output. Error 
Detector is the important role, it plays to detect the modules 
which are error, one the error is detected, Error Detector 
will send the data to Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration 
(DPR) system. DPR will then do the reconfiguration to the 
module which is an error. 
 
 
 
           International Journal of advanced studies in Computer Science and Engineering 
IJASCSE, Volume 3, Issue 2, 2014 
www.ijascse.org Page 16 
 
Feb. 28 
 
VOTER &
ERROR 
DETECTOR
Modul 1
Modul 3
Modul 2
in
in
in
Five Modular 
Redudancy
Modul 4in
out
Dynamic Partial 
Reconfiguration 
System
Modul 5in
 
Image 1. Five Modular Redundancy Design 
 
Voter architecture can be seen in the Image 2. At least 
three modules which are correct, the FMR will have a 
correct result. The output of each module will be sent to the 
"And" logic as shown in the Image 2 (a) with a voter logic 
combination that is shown in the Image 2(b). 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
F  =     (M1 and M2 and M3 ) or  
(M1 and M2 and M4 ) or  
(M1 and M2 and M5 ) or 
(M1 and M3 and M4 ) or 
(M1 and M3 and M5 ) or  
(M1 and M4 and M5 ) or 
(M2 and M3 and M4 ) or 
(M2 and M3 and M5 ) or 
(M2 and M4 and M5 ) or 
(M3 and M4 and M5 );  
 
(b) 
 
Image 2. Voter of FMR 
 
The result of voter will be compared to each module, the 
modules that have output not same with the result of voter 
will be the fault/error module. The error Detector variable 
holds the modules which are error and which are correct, it 
is an array variable that has length five bits. Following is a 
pseudo code configuration of error detector: 
 
if (F is equal M1) then ErrorDetectorVariable[0] =  
1 else ErrorDetectorVariable[0] = 0 
if (F is equal M2) then ErrorDetectorVariable[1] =  
1 else ErrorDetectorVariable[1] = 0 
if (F is equal M3) then ErrorDetectorVariable[2] =  
1 else ErrorDetectorVariable[2] = 0 
if (F is equal M4) then ErrorDetectorVariable[3] =  
1 else ErrorDetectorVariable[3] = 0 
if (F is equal M5) then ErrorDetectorVariable[4] =  
1 else ErrorDetectorVariable[4] = 0 
 
The structure of DPR is shown in the Image 3. 
Microblaze is a microprocessor that handles the Dynamic 
Partial Configuration process. The Bit stream is saved in the 
non volatile memory, the frame data contain FPGA 
Location, Configuration data and Check Sum.  Error 
Detector will send the data when the error is detected trough 
bus to Microblaze processor. When Microblaze receives the 
data from Error Detector, the Microblaze read the data of 
partial Bitstream from memory compact flash, then the data 
is sent trough ICAP, ICAP will do the configuration by 
placing the configuration data to the portion of the FPGA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 3. Structure of DPR 
 
III. IMPLEMENTATION 
Recovering modules which are error is the important part 
in this design because we expect the system will have a 
better reliability, once it is detected the error in a module the 
system should recover the module. Recover step can be split 
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into the following stage: first is checking the output of each 
module in the Detector Unit, second is when error module 
is detected interrupt to the DPR system, third is DPR 
system will receive new interrupt to recover a module which 
is an error and then doing recovering by dynamic partial 
reconfiguration correspond to the error module. 
Checking the output of each module in the Detector Unit 
can be done by putting the VHDL checking in the Voter 
Unit. The VHDL code is shown in the following code: 
 
 ErrorDetector(0) < '0' when FtResult = PR_Input1 else '1'; 
 ErrorDetector(1) < '0' when FtResult = PR_Input2 else '1'; 
ErrorDetector(2) <='0' when FtResult = PR_Input3 else '1'; 
ErrorDetector(3) < '0' when FtResult = PR_Input4 else '1'; 
ErrorDetector(4) <='0' when FtResult = PR_Input5 else '1'; 
 
It is checking the result of the FMR Fault Tolerance 
output, if the output of particular module is not same with 
the output of the FMR Fault Tolerance output then we 
recognize it is an error module. After the error is detected, 
we do an action to recover the error module. In Microblaze 
processor we check the ErrorDetector data regularly, we 
can adjust the interval to check the ErrorDetector depends 
on the need. By reading the address of the custom  
Intellectual Property (IP) of FMR fault tolerance to 
particular ErrorDetector variable, we can get the 
information which one the module that is error, following is 
the code to get the data: 
 
int error_detector_module =  
Xil_In32(XPAR_DUALMODEFT_0_BASEADDR); 
int *bits = get_bits(result, 5); 
if(bits[0] == 1 ) 
{ 
 PR_Action('1'); // Action for DPR  
} 
 
When the error_detector_module is more than zero that 
means the error in module is detected, the error module can 
be checked by the position of bit, Least Significant Bit 
(LSB) will be the first module followed by second module 
and so forth. In the above code shown that 
error_detector_module is converted to array so that can be 
easy to check the error module. 
 
DPR flow is described in the Image 4, When the error 
module is recognized, the Microblaze processor will read 
the bit stream in the compact flash non volatile memory, if 
the error module is first module then read "module1.bit" 
file, if the second module then reads "module2.bit" file and 
so forth.  Reading trough System ACE and save to the 
system ACE Buffer. Then loop to each data and send the 
data to ICAP, there is XHwIcap_DeviceWrite function to 
write the data to ICAP. ICAP will handle of the rest, to 
where the reconfiguration data will be place to the Memory 
location of FPGA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 4. DPR data flow to recover error module 
IV. TESTING AND DISCUSSION 
The design which is offered is to overcome about the two 
models of fault tolerances that have been developed, they 
are TMR with mitigation technique and NMR. Table 1 is 
the comparison between them and the design that is offered. 
TMR with mitigation technique will end when the two 
modules is an error at the same time, this is can be happened 
in the space, to handle this so we implemented FMR, in 
which limit tolerance to a fault can be up to two modules. 
NMR that has been developed can still work if there are 
three error modules at the same time, but in the mean time 
during operation the module that is error cannot be 
recovered from erroneous, this will make the system 
become degraded in several times.  To overcome the NMR 
we implement mitigation technique that can mitigate or 
recover the error modules. 
TABLE I.  COMPARISON BETWEEN FAULT TOLERANCE TECHNIQUES 
Technique 
Limit Tolerance 
 To Fault 
Mitigation  to 
Error module 
TMR with mitigation 
technique 
Up to one error 
module 
Yes 
NMR with TMR scheme Up to three error 
modules 
No 
FMR with mitigation 
technique 
Up to two error 
modules 
Yes 
 
Testing of fault tolerance can be done by providing a 
direct test on the hardware of FPGA device, by giving a 
large ion injection or given power supply disturbance [6]. 
However, this method is relatively expensive and difficult to 
obtain expected environment. Another method is using 
partial reconfiguration, [7] demonstrated that the partial 
reconfiguration is an effective way to perform fault 
injection. This method is also done by [8] and the same 
thing is done by [9], so authors chose the second way. The 
FPGA 
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module1.bit, 
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structure of the test is not different with the structure of 
DPR that was described in the image 3, in the testing, we 
add the computer connecting to the MicroBlaze to acquire 
the data during a testing that is conducted, it is shown in the 
image 5. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 5. Structure of testing based on fault injector using partial 
reconfiguration. 
 
The original partial bit stream is made corrupt or blank. 
Fault injection with partial reconfiguration, by changing 
directly to a partial Bitstream files are at risk because can 
permanently damage the FPGA device, in which the bits 
that have been extracted from the tools provided by Xilinx 
is like a program "exe" that is gotten from compiling 
windows programs. There is Jbits program that can act to 
change the partial bits, then dynamically reconfigured the 
FPGA. Currently we choose by making a blank 
configuration of the module that is tested, this method can 
be done trough partial reconfiguration using the Microblaze 
processor. 
 
We send a command from computer to Microblaze to do 
the reconfiguration with blank reconfiguration to a 
particular module. A module which is applied to reconfigure 
by blank module is selected randomly each 500 ms, and 
then we analyze the data after reconfiguration with blank 
module.  The result is following: first is after various 
randomize reconfiguration to a particular module, mitigation 
or recovering to a particular module that is blank can be 
reconfigured again to become a correct module without 
giving effect to a system that is running. Second is FMR 
fault tolerance still works as expected by sending some data 
to a module and then a module give feedback as expected. 
We also made two modules at the same time to be in error 
state, the FMR also can have a correct result. 
 
The speed to recover the module which is error depends 
on the size of the bit stream. To get the speed we apply 
calculation in real code application. We add the AXI Timer 
IP to our DPR system. We initiated and started it by 
following code: 
 
int Status = XTmrCtr_Initialize(&TimerCounterInst, 
XPAR_AXI_TIMER_0_DEVICE_ID); 
XTmrCtr_Start(&TimerCounterInst,0); 
 
The methodology to take the time which is required to do 
recovery to each module is following: first is resetting the 
timer counter because if we don't reset to some period the 
counter will overflow.  The second is getting the counter 
register variable. Then do the recovery. After finishing in 
recovery then we take the counter register again and put it in 
the variable. Following is the code that we have 
implemented: 
 
XTmrCtr_Reset(&TimerCounterInst,0); 
int startExe =  
XTmrCtr_GetTimerCounterReg(XPAR_AXI_TIMER_0_BAS
EADDR,XPAR_AXI_TIMER_0_DEVICE_ID); 
get_modul_error_and_recovery(); 
int endExe =  
XTmrCtr_GetTimerCounterReg(XPAR_AXI_TIMER_0_BAS
EADDR,XPAR_AXI_TIMER_0_DEVICE_ID);  
 
Our Microblaze processor speed is 100MHz, one integer 
represents one clock cycle, in which one clock cycle is 10 
ns. Table II shows the speed of recovering to each module, 
it includes reading the file in Compact flash and Writing to 
the ICAP. The size of the module is varied depends on the 
number of resources which is used, it can be different 
because when we use Pblock function to draw to a device in 
Plan Ahead is varied. 
TABLE II.  SPEED OF RECOVERING ERROR MODULE 
 
Module Size (KB) Speed (ms) 
1 128 224.93 
2 120 209.66 
3 81 141.59 
4 128 225.00 
5 142 261.57 
 
 
We need to estimate how much power that is required if 
using FMR. The calculation uses Xilinx Power Estimator 
(XPE) for Virtex 6. Table 3 is a calculation of power that is 
required when each module is using one microblaze 
processor. There are 1573 LUT Logic, 103 Distributed 
RAM and 1456 flip flop.  In that figure showed, the power 
that is required for each module is 0.010 w. Therefore, if 
using FMR we just multiply by 5 so become 0.050 w. If 
using FMR we multiply by 3 become 0.030 w. By using 
FMR we must consider about the power budget, will it 
satisfy with the budget or not. By using XPE to do a 
calculation estimation of power consumption above, we can 
decide whether the fault tolerance can be implemented. 
 
 
 
FPGA  
DEVICE UNDER 
TEST 
MicroBlaze 
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TABLE III.   ESTIMATION FOR EACH MODULE USING XPE  
 
 
 
 
Testing using fault injection is done many times in a certain 
time. The testing aims to know will the system run stable 
without fault, will the system have a correct result / output 
and can the system detects the error and recover the module 
which is an error.  The testing is done by giving the fault 
injection in a periodic time every one second to random 
module. Fault injection is given to module 1 to 5 and also 
fault injection is given to two modules at the same time. 
 
Image 6 is the structure of each module. Each module 
contains extension hamming code calculation to decode and 
encode the data. The input is the data that is to be encoded, 
the output will be encoded data and decoded data of 
hamming code. By that structure of each module we can 
know how the voter and how the error detector will work. 
Can the voter compare the data from the output of each 
module to get valid result and can the error detector detect 
module which is an error.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 6. The structure of each module 
 
In image 7 showed there are three important cycles. First 
is shown that the FMR system is injected the blank module, 
second when the FMR consider having corrupt module we 
send the data to system, then the system will send to each 
module to do hamming code calculation. Each module will 
encode and decode, and give the output to the voter. The 
voter now has a data and sends the data to output. Third, the  
fault tolerance system detected the error and then the system 
will do DPR to mitigate the error module. From those cycles 
we showed in the image 7 that the system was injected by 
blank module to module 3, 4 and 5, because we injected 
blank module, now those modules were corrupted. To know 
whether the system can do the operation if there are error 
modules, we send the data (1010) to the system immediately 
before the system do recovery. Each module in the system is 
encoding and decoding, and sends the data to voter. The 
data from voter is sent to a computer to be evaluated, it 
showed 00100101 for encoding and 1010 for decoding, even 
we introduce error in the first bit of encoding data the 
system still can correct the data which is an error by 
hamming code. After processing the data the system detects 
the error in a module and continues to recovery error 
modules. It showed modules 3, 4 and 5 were recovered. 
 
Those cycles are done for more than one hour and the 
system did DPR more than 3600 times, the result we got 
that the system is stable, can correct the error module and 
give output with correct data as well.  
 
 
 
Image 7. Testing result of fault injection to FMR 
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V. CONCLUSION  
Five Modular Redundancy (FMR) can be implemented 
successfully, when the error is happening in two modules, 
the system still working properly. With mitigation technique 
such error in module can be detected and corrected so that 
the fault tolerance system will try to keep away from 
degradation in each module. Using DPR, Five Modular 
Redundancy with mitigation technique can be implemented 
successfully. The speed to do recovering depends on the 
size of the Bitsream. From Xilinx Power Estimator, compare 
to TMR, FMR power consumption is slightly more, this 
because we add two modules in the FMR.  
VI. FUTURE STUDY 
Future studies will add various functions to each module, 
for example by putting the module with Microblaze 
processor to do some tasks. Implement the fault tolerance 
into a real application for On Board Computer of micro 
satellite. Testing and analyze the behavior of FMR in a real 
application. Scope for future study will be about 
implementing the FMR into a real application based on 
FPGA with DPR technology. 
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